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report on how the HSWP leadership had set about revolution, then compared the evolution of the Hungarian
 consolidating the situation in Hungary after 4 November and Polish state of affairs and pointed out their differing
1956. (The Polish leadership tried to benefit from the characteristics. He concluded that  the events in Hungary
living memories of the Soviet armed intervention in got at least 3 stages further and the extent of  purification
Hungary by showing at home the Hungarian documentary was more profound and far-reaching than in Poland.
on the  Counterrevolution in 1956 under the title  So it Finally, he suggested that the  fight had to be fought
happened, evidently believing that the evocation of  the through to the end by the Polish comrades, first with
Hungarian scenario would terrify the Polish people.) On political means or, if need be, by applying other means of
every occasion, the Hungarian leadership urged its Polish main force. The basic requirement was, above all, that
guests to draft a brief but clear program on the basis of Poland remain a socialist country.3
which party members could be activated and which could From September 1981 on, Kádár took an even more
draw wide masses and ordinary followers of socialism hard-line view on the Polish events, especially after the
 yearning for law and order. They also underlined the first Solidarity congress, at which the  Message to East
need for unity in the party leadership which would then European workers was accepted by public acclamation.
 manifest itself in the rank-and-file as well, and that it Solidarity s  Message encouraged those people  who
was of prime importance for the Polish party to carry out made up their mind to fight for the free trade union
an accurate analysis of the events. movement in the hope that their  representatives would
The meeting of Warsaw Pact party and government soon have the opportunity to meet one another so as to be
leaders in Moscow on 5 December 1980 concentrated on able to exchange their experiences on trade unions. The
one issue: the situation in Poland. The Hungarian  Message provoked extreme fits of anger in the
delegation was led by János Kádár, whose speech differed leaderships of all socialist countries. Authorities
markedly from those of the so-called  hardliners from throughout the bloc, including Hungary, launched an all-
East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia (E. out press campaign to reject Solidarity s supposedly gross
Honecker, T. Zhivkov and G. Husák respectively). While intervention although, in an Orwellian touch, they took
they seemed to urge an armed intervention, Kádár insisted pains to prevent the text of the  Message from becoming
on finding a political solution. He repeatedly stressed that public and requested workers collectives to condemn the
Polish Communists were responsible for finding a way out extremist and anti-communist Solidarity ringleaders for
of their own predicament. Integral to that aim, he added, sending it. It was this  Message that prompted the
was the preservation of the leading role of the party, the HSWP Central Committee to draft and send a letter in
socialist constitutional order, the government s authority, Kádár s name to the PUWP CC and its First Secretary.
as well as control of the mass media. He also warned that This letter expressed all the worries that had so
it was vital to correct earlier mistakes and stressed they discomfited the HSWP leadership since the Solidarity
should not focus attention on the search for scapegoats. In congress.4
this connection, he referred to the fact that ex-Hungarian When General Jaruzelski became PUWP CC First
leader Mátyás Rákosi who had been deposed from Secretary in October 1981 (in addition to his former titles
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE POLISH CRISIS 1980-1982 79
of Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense) (Budapest), is the deputy director of the Hungarian
Kádár warmly congratulated him. A couple of days later Cultural Institute in Warsaw.
the Hungarian leader declared that  polarization had
    
increased in Poland and as a result, their long-established
1
Magyar Orsz gos Lev lt r (Hungarian National Archives,
opinion and viewpoint had also grown stronger by virtue
MOL), Department of Hungarian Workers Party, 288. f 12/216-
of which the launching of a more determined, proper and
217; 11/4471; 11/4389.
rational fight that appeals to all honest people would
2
See Document No. 1 and the East German minutes of the
rapidly gain popularity against counterrevolution. At any
Communist leaders summit on 5 December 1980 in this
rate, in the autumn of 1981 the Hungarian Party, urged
Bulletin.
immediate action and was not only relieved by but also 3
MOL 288, f. 11/4397.
4
fully agreed with Jaruzelski s declaration of martial law in
N pszabads g [HSWP central organ], 27 September 1981;
Poland on 13 December 1981, a step which in Hungary see Document No. 3 (below).
5
MOL, 288, f. 4/181 and 7/641.
was somewhat euphemistically translated as a  state of
6
MOL 288, f. 5/844 and f. 5/895.
emergency. The HSWP Secretariat assembled the same
day and passed a resolution to provide Poland with
immediate economic relief in accordance with Jaruzelski s
request, endorsing  Comrade János Kádár s telegram to
SELECTED HUNGARIAN DOCUMENTS
Comrade W. Jaruzelski assuring him of Hungarian
assistance. 5
Jaruzelski requested not only economic aid from
Document No. 1
Budapest but also his  Hungarian comrades  guidance
Report to the Politburo by the Department of
concerning the struggle with  counterrevolutionary
International relations of the Central Committee of the
forces 25 years earlier, and the experience obtained  in
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, 8 December 1980
the field of socialist consolidation and the building of
socialism in Hungary. Upon Jaruzelski s invitation, a
three-person HSWP delegation led by Politburo member
CENTRAL COMMITTEE STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
György Aczél went to Warsaw between 27 and 29
of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party No. copies: 23
December 1981. Jaruzelski seemed to pay great attention
Department of International Relations Budapest, 8 Dec. 1980
to the representatives of the Hungarian fraternal party,
who later noted in their official reports on the visit that
 there had been an enormous and general interest shown
REPORT
in the Hungarian experience. They added that the Polish
to the Politburo
comrades often took Hungarian achievements as  a basis
and they seem to know little about the first steps of the
hard-won consolidation. When they are about to introduce
On the initiative of the Central Committee [CC] of the
the introduction of harsh measures, they often refer to
Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and on the
these results without proper knowledge of these
basis of the Politburo s resolution, a Hungarian delegation, [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]